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volatility” (December 4th 2008) or, to be more precise,
“algorithmic trades produce snowball effects on volatility”
(December 5th 2008). Researchers though were – until recently –
neither able to confirm nor to defeat the propositions made by the
media. Being largely hampered by limited data availability,
academics have not been able to conduct rigorous research. In
particular the relation between algorithmic trading activity and
volatility has not yet been sufficiently investigated. On financial
markets, stock prices should ideally reflect the underlying real
(fundamental) value of listed companies. Thus, high levels of
stock price volatility indicate large uncertainty about the value of
respective companies. While uncertainty may open up trading
opportunities for speculators, most market participants perceive
volatility as rather iniquitous. This is particularly true whenever
volatility levels do not reflect uncertainty about company values,
i.e. expected future cash flows, because a certain group of
investors / traders systematically impairs volatility levels.

1. INTRODUCTION

Rigorous insights into the behavior of algorithmic traders, i.e.
computers, on financial markets are essential for – at least – the
following reasons:

ABSTRACT
Being equipped with a unique high-frequency dataset that enables
us to precisely identify algorithmic trading (i.e. computergenerated) activity, we provide strong evidence that algorithmic
trading does not exceedingly increases volatility, at least not more
than human traders do. Our empirical analyses cover several
potential reasons why algorithmic trading could increase
volatility. For example, we address whether or not algorithmic
traders follow less diverse trading strategies than humans.
Moreover, we investigate whether or not algorithmic traders
withdraw liquidity from the market during periods of high
volatility.
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Today, up to 40% of executed trading volume on major exchanges
includes an algorithmic trader, i.e. a computer, as a trading
counterparty [6][11]. Moreover, algorithmic trading even accounts
for 50% of electronic message traffic [11]. While algorithmic
trading, in terms of market share, has been virtually non-existent a
decade ago, the electronification of trading systems has
accelerated the double-digit growth since then. With the
emergence of algorithmic trading, the interest in the topic by both
the public and researchers has significantly grown. The media,
however, has primarily satisfied the increased public interest with
rather one-sided stories: While the Wall Street Journal
concentrates on “the dark side of algorithms” (May 7th 2010), the
New York Times exemplarily highlights reputed disparities by
“reward[ed] bad actors” (August 3rd 2009). Beyond that the
Financial Times asserts that “algorithmic trades heighten

First, the constant evolution to fully automated securities trading
[15] calls for respective adjustments to electronic market design to
secure both market integrity and fairness. In order to do so, a
thorough analysis of market participants, i.e. agents, is necessary
[20]. In this context, algorithmic traders can be classified as
autonomous agents that (proactively) interact with other agents
[8]. In other words, the rising share of algorithmic trading activity
may entail necessary changes to electronic market design from
both a “mechanism designer” and a “system designer” viewpoint.
Second, gained insights on the influence of information
technology (IT) on market quality are most useful in the current
discussion on regulation of algorithmic or high frequency traders.
In a similar context, [19] also see the necessity to investigate
“how the use of intelligent agents influences the market structure,
the market process, the interaction of market participants, the role
of intermediaries, and the efficiency of electronic markets”.
To sum up, in order to fill inherent research gaps our overall
research question is as follows: does algorithmic trading increase
volatility?
Regarding algorithmic trading, there is no single accepted
definition yet. Traditionally, algorithmic trading is often limited to
“the automated, computer-based execution of equity orders […],
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An additional, primarily practitioner-oriented, stream of research
aims to answer which kind of algorithm to choose for which kind
of task and how to actually evaluate its` success [14][22]. The
continuously rising market shares of algorithmic trading during
the last decade, however, also called for research on the influence
of algorithmic trading on the market as a whole. Despite the
eligible interest in this topic, there is only little empirical research
in this area primarily because of the lack of appropriate data. The
stream of research that concentrates on the influence of
algorithmic trading on the market as a whole can be divided into
two sub-categories in line with the analyzed market quality
indicators, i.e. liquidity and volatility. In this context, the research
questions are usually whether or not algorithmic trading decreases
liquidity levels and / or whether or not algorithmic trading
increases volatility levels.

usually with the goal of meeting a particular benchmark” [7]. In
other words, algorithmic traders are often limited to emulate a
broker’s core competence: as illustrated in Figure 1 (Definition I),
investors interpret relevant information and make an investment
decision. Brokers are then asked to implement the decision on the
market by achieving best possible prices. Brokers (or alternatively
also investors with direct market access) may, however,
alternatively also use algorithmic trading engines to execute the
orders, i.e. for example employ an algorithm that automatically
slices a large order into smaller pieces to reduce market impact.
Nonetheless, algorithmic traders may also follow their own active
trading strategies derived from available information (Definition
II). The strategies are usually designed to close with a flat position
at the end of the trading day. Therefore, from our point of view a
broader definition of algorithmic trading seems more viable, i.e.
the “use of computer algorithms to manage the trading process”
[12].

For the U.S. market, [12] find that algorithmic trading likely
improves liquidity rather than impairs liquidity levels. They are,
however, not able to precisely identify algorithmic trading
activity. Instead, [12] use the normalized measure of New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) electronic message traffic as a proxy for
algorithmic trading activity. Given that both [9] and [11] observe
that algorithmic traders, for example, tend to continuously adjust
their existing orders on a (milli-) second basis, the assumption that
there is a connection between electronic message traffic and
algorithmic trading activity seems viable. Nonetheless, their proxy
still remains very unspecific and may not appropriately pick up
variations in algorithmic liquidity supply. In this context, [9]
points out that algorithmic traders “blur traditional definitions” on
how liquidity is supplied to the market. According to [9], the
liquidity provided by algorithmic traders tends to be rather
transient and therefore liquidity measures that are based on
committed liquidity need to be questioned.

Definition I: Best possible execution of equity orders

Investor

Broker
Exchange

AT
Definition II: Active trading strategy

Exchange
AT
Figure 1: Simplified illustration of the trading value chain

Being equipped with an intraday high-frequency dataset similar to
ours that allows for the precise identification of algorithmic
traders, [13] provide evidence that algorithmic traders should
improve both price efficiency and market liquidity. Nonetheless,
[13] were merely provided with data on orders submitted by
algorithmic traders, i.e. not all order book events. Therefore, they
were not able to for instance identify traded volumes between
humans or between humans and algorithmic traders (see Section
4). Finally, [16] provide further evidence that algorithmic traders
increase liquidity and the informativeness of prices. Their insights
were gained through a natural experiment, i.e. a system upgrade
(release 8.0) of the fully-electronic trading platform Xetra that
reduced round trip system latency from 50ms to 10ms.

We approach the overall research question as follows: we gather
pieces of evidence that will allow us to answer whether or not
algorithmic traders are – mainly – responsible for high volatility
levels. Hereby, we pick up different arguments already brought
forward by both researchers and the media. In particular, we
analyze the heterogeneity of algorithmic trading strategies
(section 4), the impact of algorithmic trading on volatility levels
(section 5), the algorithmic trading liquidity supply during periods
of high volatility (section 6), and the algorithmic trading order
cancellation behavior during periods of high volatility (section 7).
Consequently, we will finally be able to offer rigorous support in
the relevant discussion on the role of technology and computers in
today’s financial markets. This knowledge is for example highly
relevant in the course of the currently held discussion on
algorithmic trading regulation (section 8).

Regarding volatility, however, there are only very few rigorous
research results available. The most important work by [2] has
been conducted in the foreign exchange market where algorithmic
trading is a far more recent phenomenon than in the equity
market. Despite of less diverse trading strategies among
algorithmic traders, [2] conclude that, if anything, the presence of
algorithmic trading is associated with lower volatility. Similarly,
[10] finds that algorithmic trading has the potential to lower
market volatility. The study is, however, merely based on artificial
data generated within a controlled simulation environment.

2. RELATED WORK
Besides above depicted (German) information systems literature,
i.e. “market engineering” and the “impact of IT”, our research
also contributes to finance literature. With the emergence of
algorithmic trading concepts both researchers and practitioners
were interested in whether or not algorithmic trading, compared to
traditional brokerage with human intermediaries, actually creates
additional value [3]. For example, [7] found the execution quality
of the analyzed early-stage algorithms to be inferior; but as
employing human brokers is considerably more costly, the use of
algorithmic trading was assessed as basically creating value.

Overall, we may conclude that existing research suggests that
algorithmic trading does not increase volatility. Nonetheless, we
have also seen that this stream of research still lacks rigorous
empirical research. Therefore, we aim to close this gap. While
other authors make use of questionable proxies for algorithmic
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trading activity [12], merely analyze an incomplete dataset [13],
or work in an idealized and simplified simulation-based
environment [10] we contribute to existing literature by analyzing
a complete real-world equity market high-frequency dataset that
contains the best currently available proxy for algorithmic trading
activity.

Trading Program (ATP). Participants of the Automated Trading
Program oblige themselves to exclusively make use of the rebaterelevant Automated Trading User-ID whenever transactions have
been generated by an electronic system. The definition of an
electronic system is as follows:
The electronic system has to determine two out of the three
following order parameters: price (order type and / or
order limit where applicable), timing (time of order entry)
and quantity (quantity of the order in number of
securities). […] The electronic system must generate buy
or sell orders independently, i.e. without frequent manual
intervention, using a specified program or data. [5]

3. DATA DESCRIPTION
Below empirical analyses are based on a unique high-frequency
dataset directly provided by Deutsche Börse AG, i.e. the operator
of the German Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The Frankfurt Stock
Exchange offers both floor-trading and fully-electronic trading via
Xetra. In 2007, 98.30% of order book turnover in German bluechip DAX30 equities took place on Xetra [6].

Considering both above “electronic system” definition and
granted financial incentives (fee rebates), the algorithmic trading
flag can be appreciated as the best proxy for algorithmic trading
activity currently available. In other words, we are able to
differentiate between orders submitted by humans and orders
submitted by algorithms, i.e. by one of the two groups. It shall,
however, be noted that despite of the strong financial incentives
not all algorithmic traders may take part in the program. As
exemplarily shown by [13] the fee rebates “for high-frequency
trading firms, whose turnover is much higher than the amount of
capital invested, the savings [associated with the automated
trading program] are significant”. Therefore, the identification of
algorithmic traders via the automated trading program is seen as
the best currently available proxy for algorithmic trading activity.
During the following we will therefore assume that ATP members
are equivalent to algorithmic traders (AT) and that the remaining
non-ATP members are humans (H).

The provided dataset contains all Xetra order book events during
the period under investigation, i.e. between October 8th 2007 and
October 12th 2007. Each order, which is assigned a unique order
number by the trading system, should at least trigger two events
(Table 1): first, a submission event and second either a full
execution or a cancellation / deletion event. Each order can be
partially executed and / or modified more than once. In Xetra, a
modification event merely refers to a reduction of order volume.
An increase in order volume would negatively affect the priority
or execution probability of other orders. In this case, the system
automatically generates a deletion event for the modified order
and a new order entry event with increased volume. Analogue,
technical deletion and insertion events occur due to changing
trade restrictions that do not affect the price-time priority of other
orders.
Table 1: Summary of order book events
Event

Event frequency

Submission
Cancellation
Full execution
Partial execution
Others
Modification

AT
2,171,613
1,558,511
583,638
230,430
28,138
51,722

H
1,936,909
1,518,736
374,028
300,730
56,255
30,260

The dataset allows for an order book reconstruction of covered
DAX30 securities at any time during the period under
investigation, including all trading phases. Basically, all orders
submitted prior to the time of interest, i.e. order book
reconstruction, that are not fully executed, cancelled or deleted
(including “deleted” invalid day orders) remain in the order book.
The actual order limits are determined by further incorporating
partial executions and modifications. The order entry timestamp
allows for the consideration of time priority.

% of all
events
46.47 %
34.81 %
10.83 %
6.01 %
0.95%
0.93 %

4. DIVERSITY OF ALGORITHMIC
TRADING STRATEGIES
4.1 Motivation

For each event the following additional information is provided:
timestamp, international security identification number (ISIN),
order number, auction trade flag, order type, buy/sell indicator,
(hidden) size, price / limit, event code, trade restriction, and
ATflag.

In this section we do not attempt to approach the overall research
question by directly linking algorithmic trading activity and
observed volatility levels. Instead, we first want to gather rather
indirect evidence for or against the volatility-increasing
proposition of algorithmic traders by assessing the diversity of
algorithmic trading strategies.

The auction trade flag indicates the trading phase, e.g. continuous
trading, during which the specific event occurred. One order may
reveal different auction trade flags as for example order
submission and order execution can take place during different
trading phases. Order type indicates whether an order is a limit
order, market order, iceberg order or market-to-limit order. Orders
may also be restricted to be exclusively executed during a certain
trading phase (trade restriction), e.g. auctions.

If algorithmic traders tended to follow similar active trading
strategies, these should crowd on the same side of the market. [17]
also state that “volatility increases under one-sided conditions”.
For example, let us assume that all algorithmic traders were
following a strategy that capitalizes on an expected relationship
between the movement of stock A and the time-delayed
movement of stock B. Let us further assume that the developers of
this algorithmic trader employ similar models because of identical
available input, i.e. historical price time series. If the price of
stock A increases (by for instance more than 2%), the algorithmic
traders expect the price of stock B to increase, too. Therefore, all

The ATflag indicates whether (ATflag = 1) or not (ATflag = 0) a
certain event has been triggered by an algorithm. It does not allow
the identification and exploitation of activities of single market
participants though. The identification of algorithms is made
possible because Deutsche Börse AG offers its clients a special
pricing model for computer generated trades called Automated
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R_ATproxy = Vol(H/AT) / Vol(AT/AT)

algorithmic traders should try to build up a long position in stock
B, i.e. buy shares in stock B. Depending on their level of
aggressiveness, these would then either try to instantaneously buy
shares via submitting buy market orders or try to get hit by
another traders’ aggressive sell orders by submitting passive buy
limit orders. In both cases algorithmic traders were crowding on
the same side of the market, i.e. the bid side. The combination of
many aggressive buy market orders and no passive liquidity
supplying sell orders (provided by algorithms) would result in
large swings of prices, i.e. high volatility. It is against this
background that the evaluation of algorithmic trading strategies
should enable us to gain valuable insights to answer our research
question.

Rproxy = R_Hproxy / R_ATproxy
Thereby Vol(passive/aggressive) marks the daily trading volume
between the respective passive and aggressive trading
counterparties. Finally, the mean / median of the cross-sectional
daily ratio of ratios Rproxy is compared to the theoretically derived
ratio of ratios R. We consequently formulate the following nulland alternative hypotheses:
H 0 : μ (R proxy ) = 1 vs. H A : μ (R proxy ) ≠ 1
The rejection of the null hypothesis would provide evidence that
algorithmic trading strategies are more homogeneous than the
trading strategies applied by human traders.

We evaluate whether or not algorithmic traders – in aggregate –
follow less diverse trading strategies by means of two different
research approaches. If both approaches, i.e. methodologies, yield
equivalent results, then our inferred implications are seen as
robust.

4.3 Empirical Results I: Benchmark Model
Descriptive statistics for the ratio of ratios Rproxy can be found in
Table 2. Given the descriptive statistics it can be observed that
both the mean and the median values are close to one, i.e. close to
the theoretically derived benchmark ratio or ratios R.

4.2 Methodology I: Benchmark Model
In order to investigate the correlation of algorithmic strategies we
adopt the approach proposed by [2] who argue that algorithmic
traders are expected to trade less among themselves and more
with humans, if the algorithmic traders follow homogeneous
trading strategies. “At the extreme, if all computers used the very
same algorithms and had the exact same speed of execution, we
would observe no trading volume among computers. Therefore,
the fraction of trades conducted between computers contains
information on how correlated their strategies are” [2].

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the ratio of ratios

Rproxy
N

Median

1.0211
150

0.9874

Standard
deviation
0.2541

Test results for above defined hypotheses are summarized in
Table 3. Test results for both the mean (t-test) and the median
(Wilcoxon signed rank test) provide further evidence that above
defined null hypotheses may not be rejected.

On the basis of a simple benchmark model that assumes random
and independent matching of trades we are able to determine the
theoretical probabilities of trades conducted between and among
the two groups of traders, i.e. humans and algorithmic traders.
Additionally differentiating between the aggressive counterparty
who triggered a trade and the passive counterparty who has been
hit by an aggressive order, four possible trade combinations are
possible (passive/aggressive): human/human, algorithmic
trader/human, human/algorithmic trader, and algorithmic
trader/algorithmic trader.

Table 3: Test results for the ratio of ratios
Hypothesis
H 0 : μ (R proxy ) = 1

H 0 : μ (R proxy ) = 1

µ
mean

Significance
0.310

median

0.892

The results provide evidence that algorithmic traders trade with
each other as much as random matching would predict. Therefore,
we conclude that algorithmic strategies are just as diverse as
human strategies. It follows that algorithmic traders as a whole
should not particularly increase volatility because of
homogeneous trading strategies, i.e. herding.

After minor transformations (see Appendix I), the relation
between the four trade combination probabilities can be re-written
as follows [2]:
Prob(H/H) / Prob(AT/H) = Prob(H/AT) / Prob(AT/AT)
R_H

Mean

This is, however, only true for the equity market (Xetra). In the
foreign exchange market, for example, [2] find the opposite to be
true. One possible explanation might be found with the fact that
algorithmic traders in the equity market follow active profitgenerating trading strategies, compared to mere execution
strategies, less exclusively than algorithmic traders in the foreign
exchange market. Such a concentration on active profit-generating
strategies would result in a less diverse trading strategy universe.

R_AT

From above equation two ratios can be extracted: “R_H” (i.e.
aggressive human) and “R_AT” (i.e. aggressive algorithmic
trader). Both ratios might be above one if the number of human
traders is larger than the number of algorithmic traders. Given
above assumption of a random matching process the ratio of ratios
R = R_AT / R_H, however, will be equal to one. This is the case
if humans and algorithmic traders, both being the aggressive
trading counterparty, take about the same proportion of liquidity
from (other) passive humans.

4.4 Methodology II: Market Sidedness
In order to further investigate the role both humans and
algorithmic traders play in volatile market phases we additionally
apply the market sidedness measure proposed by [17]. Similarly
to above introduced ratio of ratios, the market sidedness measure
also reveals whether or not market participants follow similar
strategies.

Next, ex-post proxies for R_H, R_AT and R are calculated on a
daily basis for each security in above introduced dataset in the
following manner:
R_Hproxy = Vol(H/H) / Vol(AT/H)
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the high (low) volatility intervals were identified as those being in
the top (bottom) 5% (percentile). The empirical distribution of
realized volatility for all 30 securities during the period of
investigation is presented in Figure 2.

4.4.1 Market Sidedness
If algorithmic traders followed homogeneous trading strategies,
we would expect them to trade on the same side of the market, i.e.
either primarily buy or sell. The market sidedness measure
provides us with insights into whether trading has been more onesided or more two-sided during a certain period of time. If
algorithmic traders trade more one-sided than human traders
during periods of high volatility, we could assume them to follow
less diverse trading strategies than humans.
Market sidedness (MS) is estimated by the correlation between
ZBUY and ZSELL [17]:
ZBUY = (BUY – Mean(BUY)) / SD(BUY)
ZSELL = (SELL – Mean(SELL)) / SD(SELL)
BUY (SELL) is the number of buyer- (seller-) initiated trades in
an interval, i.e. on which side of the market has the pressure to
execute been larger. The identification of relevant intervals is
explained in more detail in section 4.4.2. Mean and SD are the
sample mean and standard deviation [17].

4.4.2 Identification of High Volatility Intervals

Figure 2: Empirical distribution of realized volatility

As we are mostly interested in how algorithmic traders and
humans behave during periods of high volatility, we need to
identify those. Being provided with a high-frequency intraday
dataset, we divide the trading day into 5-minute intervals. For
reasons of better comparison we concentrate on continuous
trading phases only. Those 5-minute intervals than contain any
kind of auction (e.g. closing auction) have been excluded from the
analysis.

As it can be observed in Figure 3 the distribution of high (low)
volatility intervals is in line with what literature suggests about
intraday volatility shapes, i.e. high volatility levels at the
beginning of the trading day and rather low volatility levels at the
middle of the trading day [21].

For the calculation of volatility levels within each of the 5-minute
intervals we apply a risk model from [4] that is based on shortterm price volatility. Realized volatility, σ[t1,t2], is calculated using
transaction returns in the following manner:

σ [ t1,t 2] = ∑i =1 ri ,2[ t1,t 2 ]
N

Here, ri,[t1,t2] is defined as the return of the ith transaction during
time interval [t1, t2], i.e. each 5-minute interval. In financial risk
research, the importance of realized volatility has been
emphasized by for example [1].
In order to account for microstructure effects such as negative
autocorrelation that may negatively affect the validity of our
volatility measure, we adjust the σ[t1,t2] measure with a Bias factor
[4]:

Bias =

q σ Δt

σ Δt ref

Figure 3: Distribution of high / low volatility intervals

4.4.3 Evaluation Setup
ZBUY and ZSELL are calculated for each 5-minute highvolatility interval. The market sidedness measure MS, i.e. the
correlation between ZBUY and ZSELL, is calculated for each
security resulting in 30 MS values.

with Δt ref = q · Δt

The bias factor is calculated by observing a bias-free reference
case (with a large enough time interval Δtref) to judge the bias of
smaller intervals Δt. As proposed in [4], one working day has
been used as Δtref and Bias has been calculated on the basis of a
one year price history for each DAX30 security. On the basis of
the calculated Bias that is measured in terms of how much Bias
deviates from 1, a corrected realized volatility measure RV[t1,t2],corr
is calculated by:

If algorithmic traders followed less diverse trading strategies than
humans, we would expect them to trade more one-sided. If
algorithmic traders consequently followed less diverse trading
strategies during periods of high volatility, we could – at least –
argue that there is an interrelation between algorithmic trading
activity and volatility because of the use of homogeneous trading
strategies by algorithmic traders. We consequently formulate the
following null- and alternative hypotheses:

RV[ t1,t 2],corr = σ [ t1,t 2 ] Bias

H
AT
) ≤ μ (MS high
) vs.
H 0 : μ (MS high

Given the realized (corrected) volatility value for each 5-minute
interval during the period under investigation for each security,
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H
AT
) > μ (MS high
)
H A : μ (MS high

Hereby, MShigh depicts market sidedness for periods of high
volatility only. MSH (MSAT) depicts market sidedness for humans
(algorithmic traders) only. Due to the fact that we were provided
with detailed high-frequency order book information, we are able
to determine ZBUY and ZSELL for the trader groups human and
algorithmic traders separately.

trading participation, i.e. both passive and aggressive (ATany).
Second, the fraction of executed volume with algorithmic traders
being aggressive, i.e. taking liquidity (ATaggressive).

4.5 Empirical Results II: Market Sidedness

ATaggressive = (Vol(H/AT) + Vol(AT/AT)) / Vol(all)

Descriptive statistics for the market sidedness measure MS can be
found in Table 4. Mean correlation values were calculated based
on Zfisher-transformed correlation coefficients. The descriptive
results provide first evidence that both groups of traders exhibit a
similar degree of market sidedness, i.e. during the N = 752 periods
(5-minute intervals) of high-volatility.

DTt constitutes a set of time dummies to control for intraday
variations of volatility. Moreover, k lags of the realized volatility
measure RVt,corr are included to control for the strong serial
correlation in volatility [1]. Finally, εt is the error term. While the
analysis in section 5 has been restricted to a certain selection of
volatility intervals, the respective inputs into the OLS regression
are calculated for each 5-minute interval (but still without those
that contain auctions).

Vol(all) = Vol(H/H) + Vol(H/AT) + Vol(AT/AT) + Vol(AT/H)
ATany = (Vol(H/AT) + Vol(AT/AT) + Vol(AT/H)) / Vol(all)

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for market sidedness
AT
MS high

Mean
0.3866

Median
0.3577

H
MS high

0.3802

0.4022

As highlighted by [2], the error term εt may not be uncorrelated
with ATt. This potential endogeneity issue arises because
algorithmic trading activity may not only have an influence on
volatility, but volatility levels may also influence the behavior of
algorithmic traders. As it is not clear in which direction a possible
bias will go, we additionally adopt an instrumental variable (IV)
approach to deal with the endogeneity issue.

Test results for above defined hypotheses are summarized in
Table 5. The median correlations are compared using the
Wilcoxon test. Test results provide further evidence that above
defined null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Hereby, we need to find an instrumental variable that is
uncorrelated with the error term εt, but correlated with ATt. As it is
very difficult to find an instrumental variable that meets these
criteria, we adopt an alternative method. Thereby, the
instrumental variable is created by lagging the troublesome
variable, i.e. ATt. Operationally, the problem is solved by means
of Two-Stage Least-Squares Regression (2SLS).

Table 5: Wilcoxon test results for market sidedness
Hypothesis
H
AT
H 0 : μ MS high
≤ μ MS high

(

) (

)

Significance
0.926

Given above results we may conclude that both groups of traders,
i.e. both algorithmic traders and humans, exhibit similar degrees
of market sidedness during periods of high volatility. In other
words, both groups exhibit a similar diversity of trading strategies.
In line with the evidence found in section 4, we therefore do not
expect algorithmic traders to increase market volatility because of
rather homogeneous trading strategies; at least not more than
human traders do.

5.3 Empirical Results
Results for both the OLS and the 2SLS regression can be found in
Table 6. While the model is not capable to explain variations in
volatility too well – given the low R2 value – the coefficients for
the algorithmic trading activity measure ATt are significant at very
high levels of significance. Moreover, the coefficients of both the
OLS and the 2SLS regression point into the same direction. The
negative coefficients imply that the participation of algorithmic
traders is not associated with higher levels of volatility, but – if at
all – with lower levels of volatility.

5. IMPACT OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING
ACTIVITY ON VOLATILITY
5.1 Motivation

Table 6: Regression results of algorithmic trading impact

After having gathered rather indirect evidence on the role
algorithmic trading plays regarding its’ influence of volatility, this
section’s approach is more straight forward. If algorithmic trading
had a worsening influence on volatility, we should observe a
causal positive relationship between the two figures. In other
words, an increase in algorithmic trading activity should result in
an increase in volatility.

Coeff. on ATany
R2

OLS estimation
- 0.005 ***
0.176

2SLS estimation
- 0.007 ***
0.174

Coeff. on ATaggressive
R2

- 0.004 ***
0.177

- 0.006 ***
0.174

*** indicates significance at the 1%-level.

5.2 Methodology

To conclude, the results of the regressions provide further
evidence that algorithmic traders should not be made responsible
for high(er) levels of volatility.

In order to derive a causal relationship between algorithmic
trading activity and volatility, we estimate a regression equation
by means of OLS:
5

RVt ,corr = α + β ⋅ ATt + γ ⋅ DTt + ∑δ ⋅ RVt −k ,corr + ε t

6. VOLATILITY & THE ROLE OF
LIQUIDITY SUPPLY
6.1 Motivation

k =1

Hereby, RVt,corr is equivalent to above defined realized volatility
measure during interval t = 1, …, T. ATt stands for two different
measures that indicate the degree of algorithmic trading activity.
First, the fraction of executed volume with any algorithmic

So far, we have primarily concentrated on the aggressive /
liquidity-taking behavior of algorithmic traders. [13], however,
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note that “AT could also exacerbate volatility by not supplying
liquidity”. In other words, volatility may not only be increased by
submitting aggressive market (or limit) orders, but additionally by
not supplying liquidity during periods of high volatility.
Moreover, [9] argues that the liquidity contribution of algorithmic
traders is more transient anyway. For example, think of the
following – rather extreme – limit order book situation:

In order to find evidence whether or not R_NSub actually has a
worsening influence on volatility, the following regression
equation is estimated:
5

RVt ,corr = α + β ⋅ R _ NSubt + γ ⋅ DTt + ∑ δ ⋅ RVt −k ,corr + ε t
k =1

Compared to the regression conducted in section 6, the only
difference can be found with R_NSubt that replaces ATt. Within
2SLS, of course, R_NSubt is lagged. The second proposed
liquidity-balance measure is based on the liquidity provided
during executions. The net-provided trading volume figure is
calculated as follows:
R_NlqAT = (Vol(AT/H) + Vol(AT/AT)) / (Vol(H/AT) + Vol(AT/AT))
R_NlqH = (Vol(H/AT) + Vol(H/H)) / (Vol(AT/H) + Vol(H/H))
Analogue to above net-submission ratio we formulate the
following null- and alternative hypotheses for the net-provided
trading volume ratio:
AT
H
H 0 : μ R _ Nlqhigh
≤ μ R _ Nlqhigh
vs.
AT
H
H A : μ R _ Nlqhigh
> μ R _ Nlqhigh
Both R_NSub and R_Nlq are calculated for both trader groups
algorithmic traders and humans.

Table 7: Exemplary order book
Bid
Size
1,000
5,000
5,000
1,000

Limit (€)
50.00
49.50
49.10
47.70

Ask
Limit (€)
50.10 *
50.50 *
55.00
80.30

Size
500 *
1,000 *
1,000
1,000

While the absolute spread, i.e. the difference between best bid (€
50.00) and best ask (€ 50.10) is comparatively small, the
committed liquidity on the ask side is already comparatively low.
The mid-point, i.e. the middle between best bid and best ask, is at
€ 50.05. If those orders that are marked with a star (*) are now
deleted, without being executed, the new mid-point would already
be € 52.25. If additionally a market buy order is submitted, it will
also be matched at € 55.00 (price).

Aiming to analyze whether algorithmic traders are responsible for
higher levels of volatility because of lower liquidity contributions,
we need to define appropriate liquidity proxys. In this case, we
believe that liquidity contribution should not be scrutinized in
isolation. Instead, it should also be taken into account how much
liquidity has been taken from the order book. This allows us a
better view on the trend in overall liquidity levels.

)

(

)

(

)

)

(

)

(

)

It can be observed that algorithmic traders, compared to human
traders, seem to be more active during periods of low volatility.
Moreover, high volatility intervals exhibit a negative netsubmission volume while low volatility intervals exhibit a positive
net-submission volume. In other words, during periods of high
volatility more volume is actively withdrawn from the order book
than added back to the order book (not even taking into account
executed volume).

The first proposed liquidity-balance measure is based on
committed liquidity, i.e. the liquidity provided by means of limit
orders in the limit order book. Submitted orders increase the
volume of committed liquidity and cancelled orders decrease the
volume of committed liquidity. Therefore, the liquidity-balance
during a certain interval is given by the net-submissions (NSub).
NSub = Vol(Submission) – Vol(Cancellation)
In order to compare the net-submission values among trader
groups, a net-submission ratio (R_NSub) is additionally calculated
for each trader group and each interval.
R_NSub = Vol(Submission) / Vol(Cancellation)
If R_NSub is larger than one, then more volume has been provided
than withdrawn during the relevant period. If algorithmic traders
were responsible for high volatility levels, we would expect them
to have a significantly lower R_NSubAT than humans during the
relevant intervals (and an R_NSubAT below one). We consequently
formulate the following null- and alternative hypotheses:
AT
H
H 0 : μ R _ NSubhigh
≤ μ R _ NSubhigh
vs.
AT
H
H A : μ R _ NSubhigh
> μ R _ NSubhigh

(

(

First descriptive statistics on associated volumes of liquidityrelated events during high / low volatility intervals can be found
in Table 8. Submitted volume, if associated with non-aggressive
limit orders, adds liquidity to the order book. In contrast,
cancelled volume withdraws committed liquidity from the order
book. Therefore, the net-submission volume provides an
indication of overall liquidity levels.

6.2 Methodology

)

)

6.3 Empirical Results

If we observed algorithmic traders to actually withdraw much
liquidity from the order book during periods of high volatility, we
could assume that there exists a connection between their actions
and the observed volatility levels.

(

(

Table 8: Descriptive statistics on
mean volumes associated with events
Events
Submission
Cancellation

Intervals: High
ALL
% AT
705,709 0.352
1,324,147 0.169

Net-Submission
- 618,438
(NSub)

Intervals: Low
ALL
% AT
102,620 0.461
73,316
0.385
29,304

This insight is in line with our argument that volatility may not
only be caused because of aggressive market behavior, but also
because of extremely passive / cautious liquidity-withdrawing
behavior. The descriptive statistics, however, do not tell us
whether the net-submission volume is negative because of high
volatility levels or whether the volatility levels are high because of
negative net-submissions. The regression results that were
expected to shed more light on this are not unambiguous (Table
9). Given that the 2SLS estimation is more accurate, we may
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conclude though that the net-submission ratio has no significant
influence on volatility levels.

Table 12: Descriptive statistics on net-provided traded volume

Table 9: Regression results for net-submission ratio
Coeff. on
(R_NSubAT&H - 1)
R2

OLS estimation

2SLS estimation

- 0.002 ***

0.001

0.179

0.171

R_NlqAT
R_NlqH

Nevertheless, aiming to answer whether or not algorithmic trading
increases volatility, we analyze the net-submission behavior of
algorithmic traders and humans during periods of both high and
low volatility (Table 10). Given the descriptive statistics and in
particular R_NSub, it can be observed that both groups of traders
exhibit lower net-submission volumes during periods of high
volatility compared to periods of low volatility. During periods of
high volatility, however, algorithmic traders still provide more
liquidity than these withdraw liquidity.

Table 13: Test results for net-provided trading volume
Hypothesis
AT
H
H 0 : μ R _ Nlqhigh
≤ μ R _ Nlqhigh

H0
H0

Table 10: Descriptive statistics on net-submission volume

NSubAT
NSubH

Intervals: Low
Mean
Median
25,023
2,188
4,281
1,201

R_NSubAT
R_NSubH

1.349
0.687

1.508
1.322

1.221
0.436

H0

1.231
1.075

H0
H0

H0

AT
low
AT
high

AT
low

) (
) ≤ μ (R _ NSub
) ≤ μ (R _ NSub
) ≤ μ (R _ NSub

H
low

)

H
high

H
low

)

)
)

µ
mean

Significance
0.001

mean

0.109

median

0.000

median

0.000

AT
low

) (
) ≤ μ (R _ Nlq
) ≤ μ (R _ Nlq
) ≤ μ (R _ Nlq

AT
high
AT
low

H
low

)

H
high

H
low

)

)
)

µ
mean

Significance
0.107

mean

0.006

median

0.725

median

0.000

Nonetheless, overall we do not find evidence that algorithmic
traders withdraw more liquidity from the market than humans do.
Therefore, we may conclude that algorithmic traders do not
increase volatility by not supplying liquidity; at least not more
than humans do.

Table 11: Test results for net-submission ratios

(
: μ (R _ NSub
: μ (R _ NSub
: μ (R _ NSub

(
: μ (R _ Nlq
: μ (R _ Nlq
: μ (R _ Nlq

The test results show that the difference in net-provided trading
volume is not significantly different between algorithmic traders
and humans in periods of high volatility. To sum up: While we
have seen a significant different in R_NSubhigh, there is no
significant different in R_Nlqhigh. In other words, algorithmic
traders do seem to provide more committed liquidity (NSub)
during times of high volatility. The provided liquidity is, however,
not used by the market in transactions, i.e. it does not translate
into higher degrees of supplied liquidity in executions.
Consequently, the negative net-submission ratios of humans
during periods of high volatility might simply be the reaction to
unintentional liquidity-supply during in executions. Furthermore,
for periods of low volatility the relative strength of R_NSub and
R_Nlq is even twisted. For example humans exhibit a smaller
R_NSub than algorithmic traders, but simultaneously show a
larger R_Nlq.

The test results for above defined hypotheses on the mean (t-test)
and median (Wilcoxon test) differences in net-submission ratios
are depicted in Table 11. For high volatility intervals, both the
mean and the median test reveal the same results: the null
hypotheses can be rejected at high levels of significance. In other
words, humans provided significantly less committed liquidity
during high volatility periods. For low volatility intervals, the
mean and the median test do not reveal the same results: the null
hypothesis for the median, however, can be rejected at a high
level of significance.

Hypothesis
AT
H
H 0 : μ R _ NSubhigh
≤ μ R _ NSubhigh

Intervals: Low
Mean
Median
1.407
0.836
2.365
1.035

Descriptive statistics on the net-provided traded volume reveal
that the difference in R_Nlqhigh ratios between algorithmic traders
and humans is not as obvious as it was in the earlier netsubmission volume (R_NSub) case. T-test and Wilcoxon test
results for above defined hypotheses give an additional indication
on the relationship of ratios (Table 13).

*** indicates significance at the 1%-level.

Intervals: High
Mean
Median
76,164
22,146
- 694,602 - 354,604

Intervals: High
Mean
Median
1.174
1.009
1.098
0.992

7. CANCELLATION BEHAVIOR OF
ALGORITHMIC TRADERS
7.1 Motivation
Closely related to above evaluated provision of liquidity, we
analyze the order adjustment behavior of algorithmic traders in
this section. [11], for instance, suggest that algorithmic traders
constantly observe the market and adapt their placed orders
accordingly. Consequently, the lifetimes of orders submitted by
algorithmic traders are significantly shorter than the lifetimes of
orders submitted by humans [9].

Independent of whether not providing committed liquidity leads to
higher volatility levels – or at least facilitates larger swings in
prices – we may already conclude that algorithmic traders are not
to be made responsible for a potential liquidity dry-up effect. Our
results indicate that algorithmic traders provide more liquidity to
the market than they withdraw from the market during periods of
high volatility. It shall, however, also be noted that our analysis
does not take into account where – at which level – the liquidity
has been added, i.e. has the liquidity contribution been useful to
the market. Against this background, we additionally evaluate the
net-provided liquidity in actual transactions (Table 12).

If algorithmic traders were somehow responsible for higher
volatility levels, then we should – at least – observe a significantly
different order adjustment behavior of algorithmic traders during
periods of high and low volatility respectively. As order
adjustment usually takes place by cancelling an existing order and
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and low periods of volatility is not significantly different from
each other and that the cancellation behavior of humans in high
and low periods of volatility is significantly different from each
other.
To conclude, we have seen that algorithmic traders cancel their
orders after shorter periods of time than humans do. Nonetheless,
in terms of a potential influence on volatility we cannot find a
significantly different cancellation behavior of algorithms during
periods of high volatility. Consequently, their cancellation
behavior is most likely not responsible for the increased volatility
levels.

submitting another order (Table 1), we analyze the order
cancellation behavior.

7.2 Methodology
The evaluation of cancellation behavior is straight forward. For
each high / low volatility 5-minute interval we examine the orders
that were actively cancelled during the interval. For each of these
orders we calculate the time to cancellation Tc, i.e. the time
difference between submission and cancellation. As we are able to
differentiate between orders that were submitted by humans and
orders that were submitted by algorithmic traders, we calculate the
time to cancellation Tc for both groups of traders separately.

8. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

If algorithmic traders were responsible for high volatility levels,
we would expect them to exhibit a significantly different
cancellation behavior during periods of high volatility compared
to periods of low volatility. Moreover, we would even expect TcAT
to be smaller during periods of high volatility because algorithmic
traders need to adjust their orders more frequently. In periods of
frequent trading activity, humans also need to adjust their orders
more frequently, but these are not necessarily able to do so
(technically / operationally). We consequently formulate the
following null- and alternative hypotheses:

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

Having conducted a literature review, we identified the impact of
algorithmic trading on volatility (in the equity market) as an area
of research that still lacks sufficient insights. Against this
background, we empirically evaluated a unique high-frequency
Xetra dataset that allowed us to precisely differentiate between
algorithmic trading activity and human activity. Hereby, we
picked up different arguments on how algorithmic traders could
potentially increase volatility.
Overall, our results provide sufficient evidence that algorithmic
traders do not increase volatility more than humans do. In
particular, we found that algorithmic traders in aggregate follow
trading strategies that are as diverse as human strategies.
Moreover, algorithmic trading participation does not significantly
increase volatility levels; actually the opposite seems to be true.
With regard to liquidity supply, algorithmic traders do not
withdraw liquidity during periods of high volatility. Finally,
algorithmic traders do not seem to adjust their order cancellation
behavior to the respective volatility levels.

)

H 0 : μ Tc
≥ μ Tc
H A : μ Tc
< μ Tc
Hereby, TcAT (TcH) depicts the time to cancellation for algorithmic
traders (humans). Tchigh (Tclow) depicts time to cancellation for
high (low) interval subsamples.
trader
high

trader
low

vs.

trader
high

trader
low

7.3 Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics for the lifetimes of cancelled orders can be
found in Table 14. First, it can be observed that independent of the
intervals, i.e. high or low volatility, the time to cancellation for
algorithmic traders is shorter than the time to cancellation for
humans. With regard to algorithmic traders only, it can be seen
that the mean time to cancellation is very similar during both high
and low periods of volatility. In other words, algorithmic traders
do not seem to particularly adjust their cancellation behavior to
existing volatility levels. Contrary, humans cancel their orders
earlier during periods of high volatility.

It shall, however, be noted that our research results are limited
with regard to the period of investigation. In the course of time,
algorithmic traders may for instance have adapted similar trading
strategies. Given that applied methodologies and models have
become increasingly sophisticated, we do not believe that
algorithmic trading strategies will turn less diverse though.
Moreover, our results may not hold true in periods of extreme
market movements. Even though we already investigated the top
95%-percentile volatility intervals (Figure 2), more extreme
market situations such as the “flash crash” observed on May 6th
2010 are not represented by our data subset. On May 6th the Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell nearly 1,000 points and single stocks
such as Accenture fell to one-cent, i.e. almost lost all its’ value, in
a 10-second period. While the market already recovered the same
day, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is still
looking for explanations and potential solutions. Against the
background of our results, we would like to contribute to the
discussion of possible causes and recall that algorithmic traders –
as often blamed – do not seem to systematically withdraw
liquidity from the market during periods of high volatility. In
cases of extremely high volatility, however, these may naturally
bail out of the market to reduce their own risk. This behavior
should also be observed with human traders. The only difference
is that algorithmic traders are able to make these decisions within
milliseconds. Consequently, markets should also be “designed”
[20] to handle actors that react within milliseconds to market
movements. In other words, as algorithmic traders do not increase
volatility during “normal” trading weeks, whatsoever constraint
on high-frequency trading cannot be the solution to the observed

Table 14: Descriptive statistics for orders cancelled

AT
Tchigh

Mean
(in sec)
777

Standard
deviation
6,565

AT
Tclow

752

5,971

H
Tchigh

4,448

13,102

H
Tclow

7,294

44,322

T-test results for above defined hypotheses are presented in Table
15.
Table 15: Test results for orders cancelled
Hypothesis
AT
AT
H 0 : μ Tchigh
≥ μ Tclow

H0

( ) ( )
: μ (Tc ) ≥ μ (Tc )
H
high

H
low

Significance
0.469
0.061

The test results affirm our descriptive analysis with regard to the
fact that the cancellation behavior of algorithmic traders in high
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[6] Deutsche Börse AG 2007. Factbook 2007. DOI=
http://deutsche-boerse.com.

problem. Instead market safeguards should be adapted to
European standards, i.e. volatility interruptions on a single stock
basis (Xetra) instead of a market circuit-breaker. Appropriately
employed market interruptions will enable for example market
makers to adequately adjust their quotes, so that their stub quotes
are not hit [18].

[7] Domowitz, I., and Yegerman, H. 2005. The Cost of
Algorithmic Trading - A First Look at Comparative
Performance. Bruce, B. (eds.) Algorithmic Trading:
Precision, Control, Execution. Institutional Investors Inc. 3040.

Future research should therefore also concentrate on the role of
algorithmic (or high-frequency) trading in periods of extremely
high volatility.

[8] Gomber, P., Budimir, M., Kosciankowski, K., Urtheil, R.,
Lohmann, M., Nopper, N., and Henning, P. 1999.
Agentenbasierter Rentenhandel. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 41,
2.

9. APPENDIX I: BENCHMARK MODEL
As stated above, the benchmark model is taken from [2]. In the
model there are Hpassive potential human liquidity providers,
Haggressive potential human liquidity takers, ATpassive potential
algorithmic trader liquidity providers, and ATaggressive potential
algorithmic trader liquidity takers. For a given period, the
probability of an algorithmic trader providing liquidity is equal to
(passive/aggressive):

[9] Groth, S. S. 2009. Algorithmic Trading Engines & Liquidity
Contribution – The Blurring of "Traditional" Definitions.
Software Services for e-Business and e-Society, 9th IFIP WG
6.1 Conference, I3E 2009; Springer, Boston, 210-224.
[10] Gsell, M. 2008. Assessing the Impact of Algorithmic Trading
on Markets: A Simulation Approach. Proceedings of the 16th
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 587598.

Prob(AT/ALL) = ATpassive / (Hpassive + ATpassive) = αpassive
Analogue, the probability of an algorithmic trader taking liquidity
is equal to:

[11] Gsell, M., and Gomber, P. 2009. Algorithmic Trading
Engines versus Human Traders – Do They Behave Different
in Securities Markets? Proceedings of the 17th European
Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Verona, Italy.

Prob(ALL/AT) = ATaggressive / (Haggressive + ATaggressive) = αaggressive
Assuming that these events are independent, the following
probabilities result for the four possible passive/aggressive
combinations:

[12] Hendershott, T., Jones, C., and Menkveld, A (forthcoming).
Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity? The Journal of
Finance.

Prob(H/H) = (1 - αpassive) (1 - αaggressive)

[13] Hendershott, T., Riordan, R. (2009). Algorithmic Trading
and Information. NET Institute Working Paper #09-08.

Prob(H/AT) = (1 - αpassive) αaggressive

[14] Kissel, R., and Malamut, R. 2006. Algorithmic DecisionMaking Framework. Journal of Trading, 1, 12-21.

Prob(AT/H) = αpassive (1 - αaggressive)
Prob(AT/AT) = αpassive αaggressive

[15] Picot, A., Bortenlaenger, C., and Roehrl, H. 1995. The
Automation of Capital Markets. Journal of ComputerMediated Communication, 1, 3.
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